Tanganyika’s political independence on December 9, 1961, was notable for the absence of conflicts between different leadership elements or racial, tribal and religious groups as to who would wield power in the new state. This degree of unity—unusual in new African countries—was the result of a number of factors.
The way the country had been peopled ensured that among Tanganyika’s many, small, scattered tribes no group was inclined or in a position through size, economic advancement or geographical position to dominate national politics.
Kiswahili influence was also vital in providing both common culture for varied elements in the urban centers which formed the hub of politics, and a common language through which the leaders could communicate with the peasant masses.
According to History of Tanzania © 1969, this unity was given organisational form by TANU with its network of paid officials and representative committees from below the district level up to the national centre.
TANU’s central goal had been to recapture independence, and this aim had in turn been the focus around which much of the political unity had been built. One problem had been solved, but independence merely meant that the country was free to seek its own solutions to further problems.
Many problems of the past persisted, some taking on new dimensions while new challenges emerged with the coming of independence.
Within the country, leaders were already turning their attention to the great task of nation building. The drive for improvement had quickened. TANU slogan became “Uhuru na Kazi” and its president, Julius Nyerere, pledged “…to try to achieve in 10 years most of the things which our colonial rulers failed to achieve in during the whole of the time they had governed our country,” as he put it in his book, Uhuru na Umoja.
Tanganyika had been united in the struggle for independence, but now had to be more firmly forged into a nation. It would not be enough to merely to prevent any disgruntled regional, ethnic or religious group, or ambitious section of the elite from separating itself off from or dominating the nation as a whole. What was needed was a commitment to the nation to the development and other challenges ahead.
The colonialists during their occupation had left a stamp on the economic, social and cultural life of the country which was not automatically erased with the coming of political independence. Even the political structures were largely creations of the British.
The actual independence constitution was drawn up by the Colonial Office.
The constitution provided for a cabinet and legislature to work on “British” model and, in spelling out the relations between the two, a competitive party system was assumed.
The first and most immediate task was for the nationalist movement to take over actual running of t he government—in a word of ‘Africanization’. There was no choice but to decolonize the administration because Europeans were leaving faster than they could be replaced.
The handful of Africans in the administration were brought in from districts to occupy senior posts at the heads of government ministries. Other qualified people in TANU and in the teaching profession were also brought into government services.
This immediately left gaps. A quarter of civil service posts were vacant in 1962.
The number of African secondary school teachers fell to less than 30.
The education of young Tanganyika was thus left to outsiders, even though political independence had been achieved.
New posts also had to be filled in embassies abroad.
During the first few months of self rule, large numbers of African took over new positions as Ministers, civil servants, in the foreign service or as political commissioners.
Opposition was taking the root. Besides Zuberi Mtemvu’s African National Congress (ANC), later in 1962, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was formed by Christopher Kasanga Tumbo, formerly a leader of the Railway Workers’ Union and for a time Tanganyika High Commissioner in London.
The ANC, PDP and other embryo opposition groups tried to focus on a mixed bag of discontents such as those of about Africanization and the position of trades unions, as well as the measure, given effect in 1963, to deprive chiefs of all official powers and duties.
But in appealing to all the small discontents of particular groups in an effort to gain support, they often appealed to conflicting interests and carried little credence.
Earlier, at the beginning of 1962, probably in part to head off some of these criticisms of—and opposition to—the policies of TANU Government which were beginning to emerge, Julius Nyerere had resigned as Prime Minister.
Rashidi Kawawa, who had headed Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) and more recently become Vice President of TANU, took over as a head of the government and at the end of the year became Vice President. Nyerere had said he had passed on the responsibilities of the government to devote more attention to the party.
It is probably true that he spent 10 months reshaping his own ideas and getting support for them among TANU leaders than actually reconstructing the party organisation.
The presidential election of November 1962 showed his undiminished popularity in the country when he polled 98 per cent of the votes.
According to African Elections Database, Nyerere (TANU) won 1,127,978 votes against Mtemvu’s (ANC) 21,276.
Now there was a need to rethink the role of TANU. With the achievement of primary goal, independence, the party machine was running down—partly as many of the more capable leaders were drained off into the government, and partly due to the absence of a clearly defined purpose and programme.
The one early attempt to strengthen the local party structure came with the appointment of regional and area commissioners as the ex-officio, regional and district secretaries of TANU.
And as a pointer to what was expected of TANU, the political commissioners were instructed to concern themselves much more with mobilizing people for development.
The specific effort of these and other leaders and the general enthusiasm stemming from independence did iin fact generate a lot of self-help projects, settlement schemes, and other spontaneous development activities. But party activists were not for the most part used to working with the various government field agencies.
Indeed they were more often in the past suspicious of the development plans of government officials, while the latter in their turn remained suspicious of politics and politicians.
The result of this legacy of suspicion was that many schemes suffered from lack of an coherent planning or popular support. Many of these projects had not allowed for recurrent expenditure or staffing, or for some unforeseen snag; others faltered through lack of supplies or technical advice, or just proved unviable.
That is not to say that many schemes were not useful or that people did not gain valuable experience.
However, after 1962 a greater degree of control was placed on these activities which subsequently had to be approved by special development committees, going up at least to the regional level.
This remains one of the key dilemmas in development in Tanzania—how to encourage and give free rein to the people’s spontaneous enthusiasms, while directing them to ensure that such energies should accord with constructive and coherent plans.
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